Got an email from the author of "Who\'s Playin\' " blog from Denton County, who said that he was listening to NPR (KERA locally) this last Friday and heard it said that the NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) had found that the Glen Rose Nuclear Power Plant\'s quench tank had been dry for years. I hadn\'t heard of this, maybe someone reading has, and he\'s going to write about it on his site-I look forward to reading it.
I saw in the paper, the Glen Rose Reporter of Dec 14, 2006, that four replacement steam generators arrived by rail last Saturday. Here\'s a pic of the honking huge part that was in the paper (see the tiny people standing by the track!) -now imagine four of these.
Got me to thinking, how would a local citizen find out information about what\'s going on there? Here\'s a few facts about the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (aka Nuclear Power Plant, which doesn\'t sound quite as innocuous and friendly). First, from the NRC site, it\'s in region 4.
Second, here\'s a report from July, 2006. (And a list of all the reports for a few years.) Now THIS is the goods about problems. For example, on page A-1
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened and Closed
05000445;446/2006003-01 NCV Three Examples of a Failure to Conspicuously Post a
Radiation Area (Section 2OS1)
05000445;446/2006003-02 NCV Operators Unable to Meet Some Critical Action Times
During Alternative Shutdown Walkthrough
05000445/2004-003-00 LER Reactor Coolant System Leak Detection Instrumentation
Inoperable for Periods Due to a Design Related Siphoning
Condition (Section 4OA3.1)
05000446/2005-001-00 LER Unit 2 Containment Personnel Airlock Door Inoperable for
a Period of Time Longer than Allowed by Technical
Specifications (Section 4OA3.2)
05000446/2005-002-00 LER Auxiliary Feedwater System Actuation Due to Momentary
Loss of the 138KV Switchyard (Section 4OA3.3)
05000445;446/2005005-02 URI Notification Form Accuracy Requires Additional Guidance
05000445;446/2005008-01 URI Operators Unable to Meet Some Critical Action Times
During Alternative Shutdown Walkthrough
And there are descriptive sessions of how these problems that are quite gripping.
(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000445/2004-003-00 Reactor Coolant System
Leak Detection Instrumentation Inoperable for Periods Due to a Design Related
On July 26, 2004, the licensee determined that the Unit 1 containment sump level and
flow monitoring system had been inoperable on December 15, 2003, for a period greater
than allowed by the Technical Specifications. The licensee determined that sump
inoperability was caused by an original design flaw in system piping elevations that
allowed the containment sumps to be siphoned to the floor drain tank. Corrective action
consisted of a system modification to add vacuum breakers to eliminate siphoning
events. No new findings were identified by the inspector’s review. This finding
constitutes a violation of minor significance that is not subject to enforcement action in
accordance with Section IV of the NRC’s Enforcement Policy. The licensee has
documented this issue in SMF-2004-002244-00. This LER is closed.
Here\'s another surprising piece on p 20- If I am understanding this correctly, with regard to public radiation safety, ONE sample by the inspector was taken. One. And it looks like that was for an entire year period.
Or this from page 7.
Green. The team identified a Green noncited violation of License Condition 2.G
and Technical Specification 5.4.1.d for failure to complete simulated operator
actions within analyzed times and for the inability to perform some of the
required actions with five examples. Specifically, the following deficiencies were
identified: (1) the shift manager was unable to easily obtain the keys needed to
access the transfer and hot shutdown panels, which delayed taking the required
actions; (2) directions for starting the safety chiller, if not already operating, were
not provided, which could have delayed accomplishing the task; (3) the licensee
had not accounted for 1.5 minutes needed by operators to perform required
actions prior to evacuating the control room; (4) operators took 4 minutes to
mitigate a spuriously open power-operated relief valve, whereas, the analysis
used 3 minutes; and (5) the 3.5 minutes needed to don the flash protective gear
prevented completion of subsequent procedure steps within the time analyzed.
The cause of the finding is related to the crosscutting aspect of human
performance because: (1) operations personnel were unfamiliar with procedures
and did not have some pertinent procedure steps available, and (2)
organizations failed to communicate changes to the procedure that impacted the
The team determined that this finding had more than minor significance because
the inadequate procedure impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone and
affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and
capability of the system that responds to the event to prevent undesirable consequences. A Phase 3 analysis of the above issues concluded the finding was of very low risk significance. Specifically, the Phase 3 analysis concluded that the 8-minute delay in transferring equipment from the control room and an additional 10-minute delay in accessing the remote shutdown room, did not result in a significant increase in risk. The analyst determined that a hot-short to a power operated relief valve was the most risk significant situation. The risk associated with a stuck open power-operated relief valve combined with a fire in the control room panel not suppressed was determined to be 2.7E-11/year. The analyst concluded that it would require a 22 percent increase in the stress levels of the operators to result in the risk exceeding the threshold to be considered greater than that of very low risk significance (Section 4OA5).